Not all bad hire days start with previously-convicted dishonest job seekers.
Morgan County, Utah apparently thought they were hiring a qualified public administration expert when they hired Garth Day as their council administrator. According to the Standard-Examiner, Day’s 2008 resume reflected that he had a Bachelor of Science degree in political science/public administration from Weber State University. He also displayed a 1998 bachelor of science in urban planning and a 2001 master’s of business administration in public administration , both from Rocheville University, in his office.
The problem is that Day never graduated from Weber State University (a real school) and Rocheville University is a diploma mill as defined by the federal Higher Education Opportunity Act:
DIPLOMA MILL- The term `diploma mill’ means an entity that–
(A)(i) offers, for a fee, degrees, diplomas, or certificates, that may be used to represent to the general public that the individual possessing such a degree, diploma, or certificate has completed a program of postsecondary education or training; and (ii) requires such individual to complete little or no education or coursework to obtain such degree, diploma, or certificate; and
(B) lacks accreditation by an accrediting agency or association that is recognized as an accrediting agency or association of institutions of higher education (as such term is defined in section 102) by–
(i) the Secretary pursuant to subpart 2 of part H of title IV; or (ii) a Federal agency, State government, or other organization or association that recognizes accrediting agencies or associations.
| Employer Lesson #1:
In my presentations to SHRM chapters, I always say that the employment application is the least expensive integrity test that an employer can ever give a job candidate. If an job seeker is evasive or lies on the employment application, don’t be surprised if the behavior continues into their employment. Employers should always verify education, employment, and other information provided by a job applicant, even when a particular credential is not required by the job description. A good background screening firm will identify a diploma mill during the verification process. |
Unfortunately, Day’s education fraud was not identified until after he plead guilty to embezzling almost $1 million from the county and numerous banks. Had the county simply attempted to verify the claims on Day’s resume prior to placing him in a position where he could create lines of credit with local banks on behalf of the county, they would have identified him as a fraudster and avoided this particular bad hire day.
| Employer Lesson #2:
Even with the most stringent background check, strong business controls should remain in place to ensure that an individual in a position of trust cannot easily take advantage of that trust for their own gain. |
Some states, like Texas, make it illegal for a job seeker to use a degree from an identified diploma mill like Rocheville University (which is listed on Texas’ list of diploma mills). In Texas, this is a Class B misdemeanor.
Are any of these individuals who list Rocheville University as the source of their degree working for your company?
Aurea Picasso, the former Welfare Director of Hanover Township (Cook County, Illinois) pleaded guilty on August 3, 2011 to stealing more than $193,110 in funds for dental work, car insurance, cell phones and her daughter’s Sweet 16 birthday party. She was sentenced to six years in prison.
This wasn’t, however, Picasso’s first felony conviction. In 2003, when she was hired as the Welfare Director she was awaiting trial on 28 counts of theft, identity theft, official misconduct, computer fraud, state benefits fraud, and forgery – all related to her role as a welfare case manager for the State of Illinois. Shortly after starting her new role as Welfare Director for Hanover Township, she entered a plea deal in that case and was convicted of theft by deception greater than $10,000 but less than $100,000.
None of the news articles we found indicated whether Hanover Township was aware of the pending case against Picasso when they hired her in 2003. One Chicago Tribune story quoted the current township supervisor as saying, “It really baffles me, as the township supervisor and treasurer, that this would slip by.” You think?
It is hard to imagine that a local government would hire someone into what seems to be a career advancement if they knew she likely stole from the state in her previous position. Unfortunately, it is not hard to believe that they didn’t run a background check on her. This blog is full of those kinds of stories.
However, Imperative Information Group conducted our own research on Ms. Cuellar and the results are startling.
Apparently, her former employer failed to conduct a criminal background check on her or, worse yet, chose to ignore the results of the background check. That bad hiring decision resulted in the identity theft scandal unveiled in last month’s indictment, according to the federal indictment.
Integrated Biometrics Technology (IBT) operates a fingerprint collection site for L-1 ID Solutions, the company to which the State of Texas sole-sourced their Live Scan fingerprinting collection network. IBT collects fingerprints of teachers and others who must receive fingerprints as part of the licensing, certification, or employment processes of Texas state agencies.
According to the indictment, Cuellar worked for IBT from March 10, 2008 until July, 27, 2008. What isn’t reflected in the indictment or in any of the press coverage I’ve found to date is that Cuellar was on probation for theft when she was hired by IBT, having plead guilty to theft charges the previous November.
The federal indictment is interesting reading. During the short time that she worked for IBT, Cuellar allegedly stole “thousands” of applications for fingerprint background checks, each containing the applicant’s “name, address, date of birth, social security number, driver license information, and other identifying information.” Cuellar allegedly “used, gave away, or traded victims’ information so that members of the conspiracy could fraudulently obtain credit cards, goods, and services in victims’ names.”
The “members of the conspiracy caused credit cards and merchandise to be shipped or mailed to various addresses in the Waco area in victims’ names.” According to the indictment, Cuellar and her friends opened JC Penny’s cards, bought Dell computers, and even opened a Green Mountain Energy electricity account at the residence where some of the group was staying.
Several law enforcement agencies are still trying to identify additional victims. The McLennan County Sherrif’s Office has created a webpage and hotline for “Reporting for L-1 ID Solutions Security Breach” in order to aid victims of this easily-preventable data breach.
Sheez. Did I mention that before IBT ever gave Cuellar access to these poor individuals’ identity information, she had already plead guilty and was serving probation for theft on a case out of Waco?
It isn’t clear whether IBT simply failed to conduct a background check on Cuellar, ran an inadequate background check (perhaps only relying on the incomplete state or “national” criminal records databases available online), or ran a background check that included their local county’s records and chose to ignore the resulting records.
That the State of Texas’ background check vendor may have failed to conduct the most basic background check on a potential employee is blindingly ironic. It is no doubt causing blinding headaches for Cuellar’s victims.
By the way, Cuellar was later charged with theft by check in another case, which was dismissed in August of last year after Cuellar presented the DA’s office with…
wait for it…
“forgery affidavits on the checks.”