Smith went into the basement with Meinke’s partner to check out the air ducts. When she came upstairs, she saw Meinke coming out of her bedroom, and it gave her the creeps.

The next day Smith says, “I started receiving vulgar sexual text messages.”

Several vulgar texts including one that talked about having someone urinate in their mouth. Smith called police, and they traced the messages to Meinke’s cell phone. He told the cops his phone had been stolen and he later got it back. Police didn’t buy it and they discovered something else disturbing when they went to Carrie Smith’s house. Someone had unlocked a window behind the bushes and left it cracked open.

“It petrified me,” said Smith. “I thought he was going to come into my home and do something.”

As it turns out, the Sears contract did conduct a background check on Meinke. It showed no records for him, despite the fact that he had recently been released from prison.

A few weeks ago, I was interviewed by Scott Lewis about the dangers of cheap background checks. In the two-part news story below, Scott explores Meinke’s history and questions how Sears, through a contractor, could send him into customers’ homes. I’m quoted near the end of  both stories. The second video tells the sad story of Sue Weaver, who was murdered by an in-home service provider. Her sister, Lucia Bone, started a nonprofit, the Sue Weaver C.A.U.S.E., to bring attention to the issue of improperly screened serviceworkers being sent into homes.

Part one (aired 11/06/2011):

Part two (aired 11/07/2011):

Morgan County, Utah apparently thought they were hiring a qualified public administration expert when they hired Garth Day as their council administrator. According to the Standard-Examiner, Day’s 2008 resume reflected that he had a Bachelor of Science degree in political science/public administration from Weber State University. He also displayed a 1998 bachelor of science in urban planning and a 2001 master’s of business administration in public administration , both from Rocheville University, in his office.

The problem is that Day never graduated from Weber State University (a real school) and Rocheville University is a diploma mill as defined by the federal Higher Education Opportunity Act:

DIPLOMA MILL- The term `diploma mill’ means an entity that–
(A)(i) offers, for a fee, degrees, diplomas, or certificates, that may be used to represent to the general public that the individual possessing such a degree, diploma, or certificate has completed a program of postsecondary education or training; and (ii) requires such individual to complete little or no education or coursework to obtain such degree, diploma, or certificate; and
(B) lacks accreditation by an accrediting agency or association that is recognized as an accrediting agency or association of institutions of higher education (as such term is defined in section 102) by–
(i) the Secretary pursuant to subpart 2 of part H of title IV; or (ii) a Federal agency, State government, or other organization or association that recognizes accrediting agencies or associations.

Unfortunately, Day’s education fraud was not identified until after he plead guilty to embezzling almost $1 million from the county and numerous banks. Had the county simply attempted to verify the claims on Day’s resume prior to placing him in a position where he could create lines of credit with local banks on behalf of the county, they would have identified him as a fraudster and avoided this particular bad hire day.

Some states, like Texas, make it illegal for a job seeker to use a degree from an identified diploma mill like Rocheville University (which is listed on Texas’ list of diploma mills). In Texas, this is a Class B misdemeanor.

Are any of these individuals who list Rocheville University as the source of their degree working for your company?

When an employer gets hit with the double-whammy of a bad background check and no controls, it can lead to the ultimate bad hire day. Enter Elisha Lang.

According to court documents, the University of Washington (a state school) hired Lang in July of 2007. At the time, he was facing felony theft charges in King County, Washington (where UW is located), related to a 2004 incident in which he was alleged to have purchased $1,073 in artwork using cancelled credit cards. He also had a 1992 criminal conviction for theft by misrepresentation in Arizona.

Did the State of Washington pay for this trip? Elisha Lang's Facebook profile picture on 9/9/2011.

In 2008, Lang was promoted to Administrative Manager to the Executive Director of the University of Washington Medical Center (his business card must have been printed on legal-sized paper). In this position, he was given a UW credit card and through an “oversight” was also granted authority to pay the credit card with UW funds. That’s right, he had the authority to approve payment of his own credit card charges. He was also assigned a UW travel account that allowed him to pay for travel and related expenses.
Recap:

A convicted thief who was at that time being prosecuted for a theft committed with closed credit card accounts is given a credit card and travel expense account with absolutely no oversight. What could go wrong?

According to the UW Internal Audit department [as cited in the Certification of Determination of Probable Cause (page 10)], between June 2008 and April 2010, Lang “purchased items such as electronics, furniture, art, and food that were determined to be for personal use totaling $204,340.” He also billed UW for almost $40,000 in personal travel-related expenses. According to court documents, Lang made “in excess of 1,890 transactions.”

Just months before the UW Internal Audit department turned their findings over to the police, Lang entered into a plea agreement with prosecutors on the 2004 theft case and accepted one month deferred adjudication probation on a lesser charge of attempted theft. He completed the probation in March 2010 and the art theft case was dismissed.

On April 11, 2011, Lang was charged with 19 counts of theft in King County, Washington related to the UW offenses. That case is pending resolution.

When asked if the school ran a background check on Lang before hiring him, a UW spokesman told the SeattlePI.com that a background check had been run but 2009 theft had not appeared because he had not been convicted.

Huh? Their background check didn’t reflect the pending criminal case for theft because the case was still active? While Washington State’s Human Rights Commission law does prohibit the blanket exclusion of applicants based on their arrest histories it does not preclude employers from considering active cases that are relevant to the position being sought by an applicant.

What’s Up With His Mugshot?

In Washington, mugshots are not available to the public, which led me to his Twitter page (tweets protected) and his Facebook page. I especially like how the Facebook profile pic is of the guy accused of illegally using his employer’s travel accounts standing in front of what appears to be Stonehenge. Exhibit A, anyone?

Robertson worked for Corgan Associates, a Dallas architecture and interior design firm, and was terminated on December 18, 1998 for “theft, dishonesty, and misuse of the company’s computer system to hack into other companies’ computers,” according to documents filed by prosecutors in Dallas County, Texas.

According to those documents, three days later, on December 21st, Robertson hacked into Corgan Associates’ computer network. His intrusion was detected and on December 29th, he signed an agreement not to access Corgan Associates computer network again.

One assumes that Corgan Associates felt that they had dodged a bullet and were glad to see the last of Stephen Robertson. Except that they weren’t – not by a long shot.

Less than two weeks later, on January 11, 1999, Robertson went to work for the movie theater chain Cinemark as a systems administrator.

On March 31, 2001, while still employed at Cinemark, court documents indicate that Robertson used a “back door” he had built into Corgan Associates network more than two years earlier.  Robertson had access to Corgan Associates’ network for one hour, twenty six minutes, and fifty two seconds, during which time he made changes to key network data. He also sent an anonymous email (or so he thought) to a former colleague at Corgan Associates, taunting him for the insecurity of his network. (See employer lesson #1 above.)

Local authorities were contacted and on August 30, 2001, Robertson (who still worked for Cinemark) was indicted in a Dallas County district court.

Six months later, on February 13, 2002, Robertson pleaded guilty to “breach of computer security,” a state jail felony. In the courts’ documents, he admits that he illegally accessed and damaged Corgan Associates’ network. As a part of his plea deal, he was given five years of deferred probation, which meant that if he managed to stay out of trouble for five years, the indictment against him would be dismissed. He was fined $1,500 and ordered to pay Corgan Associates restitution in the amount of $5,749.

The Dallas County district court’s documents clearly list his employer as Cinemark, which begs the question of whether they were made aware of Robertson’s legal problems by the court or his probation officer. It is hard to imagine that they were aware of the admissions in his plea agreement and continued to grant him access to their own network.

Certainly Robertson had learned his lesson from all of these troubles and straightened his life out to become a model citizen and employee, one might say. Well, not quite.

Two and half years after his guilty plea in Dallas County, Robertson committed a new computer offense – this time against Cinemark.

In mid-2004, Cinemark moved Robertson to “contractor status” and told him that his services would no longer be needed after that November. On November 19, 2004, Robertson illegally accessed Cinemark’s network and, according to his later admission in federal court, “removed some of my personal files, accessed a SQL server and stopped the service for financial applications… deleted a 60 GB PeopleSoft database, and stopped the automatic routines for the Cinemark server.”

The US Secret Service investigated this offense and Robertson was indicted in federal court for computer sabotage.

On December 12, 2006, Robertson’s Dallas County probation was discharged unsatisfactorily with a note that he was now in federal custody. (See employer lesson #3 above.)

On January 11, 2007, Robertson entered into a plea agreement with the federal prosecutor. He pleaded guilty to computer sabotage and was sentenced to 41 months in federal prison followed by three years of probation. He was also ordered to pay Cinemark $106,300 in restitution. He was released from the Federal Bureau of Prisons on September 29, 2009 (less than 41 months most likely because of time served awaiting trial and good time received) and will likely be on probation until 2012.

Now here’s the kicker - while his criminal history would dissuade almost any employer from hiring him in any capacity that dealt with computers, Robertson has formed his own consulting practice according to his LinkedIn profile and professional website. Clients listed since his release include The City of Dallas and Parkland Health and Hospital System (Dallas’ public hospital system).

According to an article in The Oregonian, Laughlin said that in 2010, Lee claimed that she had to make a trip to California. What he didn’t know at the time was that she didn’t go to California - she was serving 90 days in the county jail related to her criminal mistreatment conviction. She also received three years probation with the condition that she not work for any elderly or dependent person. A condition that she was violating by caring for Laughlin’s mother.

We are waiting on copies of the 2010 case to arrive from the court in hopes of learning more about the kind of mistreatment the victim in that case suffered.

According to the article, another individual complained to police three years ago that Lee had stolen the identity of his mother, for whom Lee was a caregiver.

As the Baby Boom Generation continues to age, there will be increased demand for non-medical home caregivers. There will also be more people who are unfit for those sorts of those positions or, worse yet, who are seeking to prey on their elderly patients. Unfortunately, many people who hire individuals to come into their homes and interact with their families do not exercise due diligence in making sure that they are competent and safe. A part of that due diligence would certainly be a criminal background check. However, references from prior families with whom the individual has worked and verification of their credentials is equally important.

Unfortunately, one of QC Character’s first hires was James Lester Rogers. The company sent Rogers dressed as the Sesame Street character called Cookie Monster to the Mississippi Valley Fairgrounds to drum up a little business. While Rogers was at the entrance to the fairgrounds, he saw an old acquaintance and removed his Cookie Monster head to say hello to him. In the excitement of his new job and being reacquainted with his old friend, Rogers forgot several things:

Rogers was previously convicted of committing lascivious acts with a child in Linn County, Iowa and is listed on the Iowa Sex Offender Registry. He also had two contempt of court findings against him subsequent to his conviction.

QC Characters’ owner admitted to news sources that he made a serious mistake by not running a background check on Rogers. “I should have took my time, and done a background check but … you learn from your mistakes.” He says that he had intended to send Rogers to children’s parties and other events, which also would have been a violation of the terms of Rogers’ sex offender registration. Fortunately, the business was so new (or ill-conceived) that they had not yet had any customers. Rogers was quickly arrested (imagine having to move through Central Booking in a Cookie Monster outfit) and, we assume, QC Characters has changed its name because of all of the bad publicity.

Many inexperienced employers make the similar mistakes in underestimating the risks associated with hiring people without first conducting a background check. You can bet that the owner of QC-Characters won’t make that mistake again.

This wasn’t, however, Picasso’s first felony conviction. In 2003, when she was hired as the Welfare Director she was awaiting trial on 28 counts of theft, identity theft, official misconduct, computer fraud, state benefits fraud, and forgery – all related to her role as a welfare case manager for the State of Illinois. Shortly after starting her new role as Welfare Director for Hanover Township, she entered a plea deal in that case and was convicted of theft by deception greater than $10,000 but less than $100,000.

None of the news articles we found indicated whether Hanover Township was aware of the pending case against Picasso when they hired her in 2003. One Chicago Tribune story quoted the current township supervisor as saying, “It really baffles me, as the township supervisor and treasurer, that this would slip by.” You think?

It is hard to imagine that a local government would hire someone into what seems to be a career advancement if they knew she likely stole from the state in her previous position. Unfortunately, it is not hard to believe that they didn’t run a background check on her. This blog is full of those kinds of stories.

Two months later, Gilbert was hired by Comfort Keepers as a non-medical caregiver, a “sitter”, in an Alzheimer’s care unit on October 23, 2005. Comfort Keepers ran a “national” criminal background check from CBCInnovis that failed to disclose his criminal history or his sex offender registration.

On November 7, 2005, two weeks after Gilbert was hired, a 77-year-old resident identified him as the man who raped her.  He faced no criminal charges in this case, apparently due to the Alzheimer patient’s unreliability as a witness.

The family did sue Comfort Keepers and the Alzheimer’s care facility, and CBCInnovis. The civil case resulting from these allegations was settled April 8, 2009 – terms not disclosed.

The following is an excerpt from the plaintiff’s petition in this case:

It is hard to explain how so many people and businesses, who are charged with the responsibility of protecting and safeguarding our elderly, could all fail to do their jobs in such a negligent and grossly negligent manner that a known sexual predator such as Michael Henderson a/k/a Michael Anthony Gilbert could be allowed to molest and abuse a poor, defenseless 77 year old grandmother like Colleen Stagner, but that is what happened in this case. Not only were Defendants being paid to care for and protect innocent, foreseeable victims like Colleen from being sexually assaulted, they actually interviewed, hired, and placed a registered sex offender in a position to enable him to carry out these outrageous acts of physical and sexual abuse.

According to court documents, which include a copy of Gilbert’s employment application, Gilbert responded to the criminal history question on the application with “will discuss in interview.”

I always advise employers to respond “No, we won’t” and move on to the next applicant when an applicant fails to fully respond to questions on the employment application. In this case, however, Comfort Keepers interviewed Gilbert and made the following notation on the application: “Michael discussed that this was something minor that happened over 12 years ago – not on criminal record.”

Obviously Gilbert lied and the “national” criminal background check failed to catch the lie.

The fact is that there is no such thing as a “national” or “nationwide” criminal records database that has any level of reliability. The only way to obtain a criminal history on an individual that approaches reliable is to search the county, state, and federal records in each jurisdiction where the person has lived, worked, or attended school. The “national” database (Imperative Information Group prefers to call it a multi-jurisdictional criminal records database) should be used only as a source of possible records – not relied upon as the primary source of records.

UPDATE:

In April 2011, authorities say Gilbert attempted to avoid arrest in another sexual assault by again faking his own death. He is accused of fatally shooting a homeless man, putting the body in his car’s trunk and setting the car ablaze, hoping police would think that the body was his. He is currently being prosecuted. Hopefully, he won’t see daylight for a long, long time.

According to television station KTRE: The owner says they didn’t check him since he was only contracted for ten days.

A female resident says she awoke in her bedroom on January 6th to find Diaz pulling off her shorts and began screaming, according to The Lufkin Daily News. When her roommate responded with a gun, Diaz left the apartment.

Since the incident, several other residents have made complaints against Diaz, including one, according to television station KLTV, who says he… it’s just too gross – you can read it on their website if you wish. (Warning: It is both graphic and gross.)

Many employers fail to conduct a meaningful criminal background check on contingent or temporary workers, thinking that they will only be around for a short time. That faulty thinking fails to recognize that a temporary worker with ill intent only needs a short amount of time to identify the vulnerabilities of the employer, coworkers, or customers.  Imperative recommends that our clients select temporary employees with the same degree of diligence as regular employees.

Greg’s point is that there is a tendency in a religious environment to presume to know someone’s “heart” and give them the benefit of the doubt along with access to kids, the infirm, or others who are vulnerable. The problem is that many deeply troubled and potentially dangerous people know how to talk the talk and appear to walk the walk. By the time their deception is identified, it is often too late.

According to The Fort Worth Star-Telegram, Porter has been accused of placing a hidden camera in a bathroom used by employees at Harbor Lakes Plaza Nursing and Rehabilitation, where he was acting as a chaplain.

Apparently, only after this investigation began did the nursing home or The Church at Granbury learn that he was convicted in Manatee County, Florida for nine counts of video voyeurism. According to the probable cause affidavit filed in the Florida case, Porter videoed the bathroom activities of members of a juvenille Bible study group he held in his apartment. He was sentenced to 120 days in prison and one year probation, which he was allowed to serve in Texas.

What is even more disconcerting is that while on probation he received counseling at Gateway Community Church in Granbury, and was allowed to volunteer and act as a chaplain by both Granbury churches. “We let him do that because he was in counseling at the same time,” Gateway’s former music minister, who also counseled Porter, is quoted as saying. He added that he now believes that Porter lied to him about the Florida circumstances, though the Star-Telegram article doesn’t say how.

Which brings us to another issue my friend Greg Love often points out. Individuals who act out in this way (Greg often refers to them as predators) know who to cultivate the trust of gatekeepers – parents, church leaders, workplace supervisors – the very people whose job it is to protect vulnerable populations.

When conducting background checks, we often see situations where an employment applicant will admit to a minor criminal offense that, once the background check has been completed, turns out to be a gross reduction of the actual offense(s). Employers are sometimes so impressed that the applicant is forthright about past offenses, particularly minor but emberrasing ones, that they let down their guard and fail to conduct proper due diligence.

Additionally, many organizations seem to equate how much an individual is being compensated with the level of the background check that is conducted. Never mind that a “volunteer pastor” or “chaplain” is automatically given immediate credibility by those he or she encounters and the potential for damage to others and the organization is often greater than many other more highly compensated positions. Organizations need to carefully review the risks associated with a position rather than the compensation level when determining the necessary level of due diligence.

Meanwhile, Hood County Sheriff investigators are still trying to identify Porter’s vicitims from the hidden camera images they found. He is out on $20,000 bond so if you use a public restroom in Granbury… well, I’m just saying.